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Measure: BarredWindows
Description
Protection of windows with bars. Thus intruders cannot enter a building by destroying a window. The aim is to ensure that only authorized personnel can enter sensitive objects or sites.
Comments
It might be sufficient to implement bars at windows below the second floor as the height of all other windows could be a sufficient physical barrier.
Event source type
External attacker
Event types
Destruction
Manipulation
Pollution
Risk reduction mechanism
Frequency/Likelihood
Threat Types
Physical
Cyber-Physical
Action characteristics
Proactive
Measure type
Physical Barriers
event_ measures
Event-Measure: 98156
Event-Measure: 98411
Event-Measure: 98533
Event-Measure: 98585
Event-Measure: 98662
Event-Measure: 99717
Event-Measure: 99868
Event-Measure: 100087
Event-Measure: 100208
Event-Measure: 100515
Event-Measure: 100538
Event-Measure: 101344
Event-Measure: 101708
Event-Measure: 101997
Event-Measure: 102451
Event-Measure: 102604
Event-Measure: 102797
Event-Measure: 103202
Event-Measure: 103254
Event-Measure: 103283
Event-Measure: 103414
Event-Measure: 103591
Event-Measure: 103969
Event Consequences
Quantity
Quality
Financial
Reputation
Asset types
Pressure Boosting Station
Water Treatment Plants
Events
Basic Event 63 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of WTP operation
Basic Event 219 - DoS attack to WTP process system PLC
Gate 219 - Staff controlled hydraulic processes run without WTP data
Basic Event 261 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of PBS operation
Gate 142 - Chemical overdosing due to loss of WTP control
Basic Event 65 - DoS attack to dosing system PLC
Basic Event 80 - External person induces chemical or radioactive substance to treated water tank
Gate 116 - Chemical overdosing due to misled WTP operation
Basic Event 279 - Malware corrupts prediction model database
Gate 177 - Staff or PLC controlled processes run on altered WTP data
Gate 186 - Quality verification process runs on altered WTP data
Basic Event 64 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP control signals
Gate 220 - Staff or PLC controlled hydraulic processes run on altered WTP data
Gate 122 - THM by-product formation in WTP
Gate 185 - Undetected contamination of WTP chemical solutions
Basic Event 214 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of WTP operation
Basic Event 61 - External person breaks in to WTP and takes over SCADA undetected
Basic Event 259 - External person physically damages PBS PLC
Basic Event 72 - External person induces biological substances to treated water tank
Gate 176 - Staff controlled processes run without WTP data
Gate 111 - Insufficient disinfection due to loss of WTP control
Basic Event 276 - SQL injection to data used for demand prediction
Basic Event 250 - Malware alters PLC statements that control pump
Specific Assets
Control Center
Control System
Drinking Water Tanks
Pressure Boosting Station
Water under treatment
Measure ID
M06
Name
BarredWindows
Risk reduction mechanism
Frequency/Likelihood
Action characteristics
Proactive