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Measure: CryptographicProcesses

Description

Implementation of cryptographic processes. Thus any relevant data is encrypted and therfore unreadable for an attacker. The aim is to ensure that any attacker getting access to sensitive data cannot read the data due to its encryption.

Comments

Additionally to the data encryption, the possibility of encrypting also communication connections should be checked in dependence on the necessary effort for encryption and its practicability. The source and integrity of used cryptographic keys should also be checked. The keys should be changed in a sufficient frequency. Encryptions can be realized for transferred data (wireless connections, wires, mobile storage devices) and for data stored on servers, clients, mobile devices or similar.

Event source types

External attacker
Internal attacker
Human fault

Event type

Manipulation

Risk reduction mechanism

Consequences

Threat Types

Cyber
Cyber-Physical

Action characteristics

Proactive

Measure types

Cyber Barriers
Consequence Mitigation
Action and Crisis Management Plans and Training

event_ measures

Event Consequences

Quantity
Quality
Financial
Reputation

Asset types

Drinking Water Network
Drinking Water Tanks
Pressure Boosting Station
Water Abstraction Points
Water Treatment Plants

Events

Basic Event 153 - External attacker manipulates WTP transmission devices
Basic Event 227 - Fake news about contamination in WTP using manipulated water company public communication
Basic Event 151 - External person physicaly manipulates tank quality sensor readings
Basic Event 261 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of PBS operation
Basic Event 168 - External person physically manipulates surface water system sensor readings
Basic Event 211 - External attacker manipulates WTP transmission devices
Basic Event 195 - External person manipulates data transmission system of wells
Gate 113 - Lower efficiency of WTP disinfectant undetected
Basic Event 49 - Internal person physically manipulates WTP sensor readings
Basic Event 65 - DoS attack to dosing system PLC
Basic Event 64 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP control signals
Gate 260 - WDN control system manipulated
Gate 239 - Mislead PLC controlled WDN tank refill process
Basic Event 156 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates abstraction point quality sensors
Gate 193 - Surface water management system functions on altered data
Basic Event 275 - Malware alters WDN control statements
Basic Event 151 - External person physicaly manipulates tank quality sensor readings
Basic Event 215 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP control signals
Basic Event 51 - Internal cyber manipulation of WTP sensor signal
Gate 186 - Quality verification process runs on altered WTP data
Basic Event 236 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN tank level sensor signals
Basic Event 201 - Malware performs DoS attack on abstraction well PLCs
Basic Event 218 - Accidental errors by authorized user while maintaining information system
Basic Event 277 - Malware tampers network topology characteristics on prediction models (e.g. tank volume curve)
Basic Event 170 - External attacker manipulates surface water system transmission devices
Basic Event 167 - External person physically manipulates surface water system sensor readings
Gate 111 - Insufficient disinfection due to loss of WTP control
Basic Event 252 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN PBS sensor signals
Basic Event 155 - External person physicaly manipulates abstraction point quality sensor readings
Basic Event 209 - External person physically manipulates WTP sensor readings
Basic Event 265 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN valve sensor signals
Basic Event 194 - External person manipulates transmission wires of wells
Basic Event 250 - Malware alters PLC statements that control pump
Basic Event 63 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of WTP operation
Basic Event 152 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates quality sensor signals
Basic Event 237 - Malware alters PLC statements that control WDN tank refill
Basic Event 214 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of WTP operation
Basic Event 267 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN valve control signals
Basic Event 152 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates quality sensor signals
Basic Event 196 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates well sensor signal
Gate 177 - Staff or PLC controlled processes run on altered WTP data
Basic Event 50 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP sensor signal
Basic Event 240 - Upadate of OS causes false positive alarms from Event Detection System
Basic Event 157 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN quality sensor readings
Basic Event 276 - SQL injection to data used for demand prediction
Basic Event 210 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP sensor signal
Basic Event 48 - External person physically manipulates WTP sensor readings
Basic Event 189 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates groundwater quality sensor signal
Basic Event 169 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates surface water system sensor signal
Gate 220 - Staff or PLC controlled hydraulic processes run on altered WTP data
Basic Event 264 - Malware alters PLC statements that control valve
Basic Event 219 - DoS attack to WTP process system PLC

Specific Assets

Control System
Media Channels
Sensor
Server
Transferred Information
Transmission Devices

Measure ID

M48

Name

CryptographicProcesses

Risk reduction mechanism

Consequences

Action characteristics

Proactive

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 740610. The publication reflects only the authors' views and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. All illustrations in the homepage are attributed to rudall30/Shutterstock.com.