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STOP-IT Water Quality FT
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Event source type: Internal attacker
Description
An internal attacker belongs to the staff of the water utility. An internal attacker carries out attacks intentionally.
Measures
FencesAndWalls
MotionDetectors
CameraSurveillance
Patrols
FloodProtection
BinaryContacts
SecureDoorsAndWindows
SupervisionOfExternals
SmokeDetectors
ContainmentStructures
FiltersInAerationProcesses
OscillationSensors
ValvePositionSensors
LevelSensors
AutomatedValveControl
ProcedureForPersonnelChanges
EmployeesTrainings
EmergencyPlans
RedundantAssetsAndInfrastructures
DistributedEnergySupply
EmergencyGenerators
AdditionalStorageCapacity
WaterIntakeAdaption
WaterQualityOfflineSurveillance
MonitoringAndControlOfDistributionSystem
AdditivesQualityCheck
InfrastructureAndAssetInspections
InformationSecurityGuidelines
InformationSecurityManagementSystem
PasswordSecurity
TwoFactorAuthentification
RestrictedAccesToITSytem
NonManipulationConnectionTool
CryptographicProcesses
DataBackups
NetworkSeparation
AppropriateLayingOfWires
ServerRoomSetup
MirroredSCADA
DataIntegrityCheck
MalwareProtectionGuidelines
MalwareProtectionSoftware
EntranceAccessControl
SecureLocks
PressureAndFlowSensors
OperatingParameterSurveillance
SecurityCheckOfEmployees
WaterQualityOnlineSurveillance
WaterTreatmentControl
WaterNetworkInterventionsForWaterSupplyRecovery
PatchAndChangeManagement
NetworkTrafficAnalysis
SecurityOfWirelessNetworks
SoftwareManagement
DeletionAndDestructionOfDataCarriers
Documentation
IdentificationClassificationAndRiskAssessmentTool
Events
Gate 234 - Contamination of WDN tank
Gate 236 - Outflow of WDN tank is interrupted
Gate 237 - Outflow valve of WDN tank closed
Gate 239 - Mislead PLC controlled WDN tank refill process
Gate 260 - WDN control system manipulated
Gate 219 - Staff controlled hydraulic processes run without WTP data
Gate 220 - Staff or PLC controlled hydraulic processes run on altered WTP data
Gate 191 - Mislead surface water management system
Gate 193 - Surface water management system functions on altered data
Basic Event 236 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN tank level sensor signals
Basic Event 245 - DoS attack on WDN pump
Basic Event 260 - Internal person silently takes over PBS SCADA control
Basic Event 261 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of PBS operation
Basic Event 272 - WDN control center destroyed by intentional flood
Basic Event 19 - Internal person intrudes WWTP control room and takes over SCADA
Basic Event 179 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates reservoir control signals
Basic Event 186 - Quality sensor transmission wires of observation wells manipulated
Basic Event 188 - Internal person physically manipulates groundwater quality sensor readings
Basic Event 199 - Internal person silently takes over abstraction well SCADA control
Basic Event 201 - Malware performs DoS attack on abstraction well PLCs
Basic Event 213 - Internal person silently takes over WTP SCADA control
Basic Event 214 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of WTP operation
Basic Event 219 - DoS attack to WTP process system PLC
Basic Event 221 - Internal person physically destroys WTP process system
Basic Event 222 - A valve is opened and floods equipment
Gate 123 - Contamination at WDN water tank
Gate 146 - Free chlorine residual in WDN
Gate 115 - Additive and/or disinfectant overdosing
Gate 116 - Chemical overdosing due to misled WTP operation
Gate 176 - Staff controlled processes run without WTP data
Gate 177 - Staff or PLC controlled processes run on altered WTP data
Gate 142 - Chemical overdosing due to loss of WTP control
Gate 118 - Disinfectant composition altered
Gate 117 - Staff or PLC controlled disinfection processes run on altered WTP data
Gate 111 - Insufficient disinfection due to loss of WTP control
Gate 178 - Dosing system disabled
Gate 179 - Dosing system destroyed
Gate 122 - THM by-product formation in WTP
Gate 187 - Contamination of WTP chemical solutions
Gate 189 - Additives composition altered
Basic Event 53 - Biological, chemical or radioactive substance injected to water tank
Basic Event 149 - Biological, chemical or radioactive substance injected through pipe
Basic Event 46 - Internal person jams WTP sensor signal transmission
Basic Event 47 - Internal person physically destroys WTP sensors
Basic Event 49 - Internal person physically manipulates WTP sensor readings
Basic Event 51 - Internal cyber manipulation of WTP sensor signal
Basic Event 62 - Internal person silently takes over SCADA control
Basic Event 63 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of WTP operation
Basic Event 45 - Internal person adds substance to WTP disinfectant storage tank
Basic Event 65 - DoS attack to dosing system PLC
Basic Event 69 - Internal person physically destroys WTP dosing system
Basic Event 77 - External person adds substance to WTP coagulant storage tank
Basic Event 78 - Internal person adds substance to WTP coagulant storage tank
Basic Event 19 - Internal person intrudes WWTP control room and takes over SCADA
Basic Event 162 - Internal person adds substance to WTP stored additives
Name
Internal attacker