STOP-IT - Detail page

Home
FT
SP Wizard
- Risknought
Lists
- Measures
- Events
- Tools
- ST Procedures
Search
Login

Measure: NetworkSeparation

Description

Secure installation and operation of different network security zones. Thus unauthorized entries into sensitive networks can be complicated. The aim is to ensure the integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of all data in the network.

Comments

This measure is dealing with the IT networks. The complete network setup, structure, changes or similar must be documented in detail. The network must be separated into different security zones (e.g. internal network, demilitarized zone [DMZ], external connections [including untrustworthy networks like the internet]). Different security zones should also be physically separated. Firewalls must separate the security zones. Clients and server must be located in different segments of the network. Sensitive information must be transferred by using state-of-the-art secure protocols.

Event source types

External attacker
Internal attacker
Natural phenomena

Event type

Manipulation

Risk reduction mechanism

Frequency/Likelihood

Threat Types

Cyber
Physical
Cyber-Physical

Action characteristics

Proactive

Measure types

Physical Barriers
Cyber Barriers
Control System
Consequence Mitigation

event_ measures

Event Consequences

Quantity
Quality
Financial
Reputation

Asset types

Drinking Water Network
Drinking Water Tanks
Pressure Boosting Station
Water Abstraction Points
Water Treatment Plants

Events

Basic Event 170 - External attacker manipulates surface water system transmission devices
Basic Event 167 - External person physically manipulates surface water system sensor readings
Gate 111 - Insufficient disinfection due to loss of WTP control
Basic Event 209 - External person physically manipulates WTP sensor readings
Basic Event 265 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN valve sensor signals
Basic Event 252 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN PBS sensor signals
Basic Event 155 - External person physicaly manipulates abstraction point quality sensor readings
Basic Event 194 - External person manipulates transmission wires of wells
Basic Event 250 - Malware alters PLC statements that control pump
Basic Event 152 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates quality sensor signals
Basic Event 63 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of WTP operation
Basic Event 237 - Malware alters PLC statements that control WDN tank refill
Basic Event 196 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates well sensor signal
Basic Event 214 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of WTP operation
Basic Event 187 - External person physically manipulates groundwater quality sensor readings
Gate 177 - Staff or PLC controlled processes run on altered WTP data
Basic Event 267 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN valve control signals
Basic Event 152 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates quality sensor signals
Basic Event 235 - External person in situ manipulates WDN tank level sensor
Basic Event 50 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP sensor signal
Basic Event 157 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN quality sensor readings
Basic Event 251 - External person in situ manipulates PBS transmission devices
Basic Event 276 - SQL injection to data used for demand prediction
Basic Event 210 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP sensor signal
Basic Event 48 - External person physically manipulates WTP sensor readings
Basic Event 189 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates groundwater quality sensor signal
Basic Event 264 - Malware alters PLC statements that control valve
Basic Event 153 - External attacker manipulates WTP transmission devices
Basic Event 169 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates surface water system sensor signal
Gate 220 - Staff or PLC controlled hydraulic processes run on altered WTP data
Basic Event 219 - DoS attack to WTP process system PLC
Basic Event 227 - Fake news about contamination in WTP using manipulated water company public communication
Basic Event 151 - External person physicaly manipulates tank quality sensor readings
Basic Event 62 - Internal person silently takes over SCADA control
Basic Event 179 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates reservoir control signals
Basic Event 197 - External person physically manipulates well sensor signal
Basic Event 261 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of PBS operation
Basic Event 211 - External attacker manipulates WTP transmission devices
Basic Event 168 - External person physically manipulates surface water system sensor readings
Basic Event 195 - External person manipulates data transmission system of wells
Basic Event 213 - Internal person silently takes over WTP SCADA control
Gate 176 - Staff controlled processes run without WTP data
Basic Event 64 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP control signals
Basic Event 186 - Quality sensor transmission wires of observation wells manipulated
Gate 260 - WDN control system manipulated
Gate 239 - Mislead PLC controlled WDN tank refill process
Basic Event 49 - Internal person physically manipulates WTP sensor readings
Basic Event 65 - DoS attack to dosing system PLC
Basic Event 199 - Internal person silently takes over abstraction well SCADA control
Basic Event 156 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates abstraction point quality sensors
Gate 193 - Surface water management system functions on altered data
Basic Event 188 - Internal person physically manipulates groundwater quality sensor readings
Basic Event 151 - External person physicaly manipulates tank quality sensor readings
Basic Event 275 - Malware alters WDN control statements
Basic Event 238 - External person in situ manipulates WDN tank transmission system
Basic Event 51 - Internal cyber manipulation of WTP sensor signal
Gate 219 - Staff controlled hydraulic processes run without WTP data
Basic Event 215 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP control signals
Basic Event 236 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN tank level sensor signals
Gate 186 - Quality verification process runs on altered WTP data
Basic Event 201 - Malware performs DoS attack on abstraction well PLCs
Basic Event 61 - External person breaks in to WTP and takes over SCADA undetected
Basic Event 260 - Internal person silently takes over PBS SCADA control
Basic Event 277 - Malware tampers network topology characteristics on prediction models (e.g. tank volume curve)

Specific Assets

Control System
Media Channels
Pump
Sensor
Server
Transferred Information
Transmission Devices

Measure ID

M50

Name

NetworkSeparation

Risk reduction mechanism

Frequency/Likelihood

Action characteristics

Proactive

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 740610. The publication reflects only the authors' views and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. All illustrations in the homepage are attributed to rudall30/Shutterstock.com.