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Measure: EmergencyGenerators

Description

Installation of emergency generators. Thus a complete failure of external energy supply can be compensated by the emergency generators. The aim is to prevent downtimes due to a lack of electrical energy.

Event source types

External attacker
Internal attacker
Human fault
Natural phenomena
Interdependent CI

Event types

Interruption
Manipulation

Risk reduction mechanism

Consequences

Threat Types

Cyber
Physical
Cyber-Physical

Action characteristics

Proactive

Measure types

Redundancy
Consequence Mitigation

event_ measures

Event Consequences

Quantity
Quality
Financial
Reputation

Asset types

Drinking Water Network
Drinking Water Tanks
Pressure Boosting Station
Water Abstraction Points
Water Treatment Plants

Events

Basic Event 195 - External person manipulates data transmission system of wells
Basic Event 186 - Quality sensor transmission wires of observation wells manipulated
Gate 176 - Staff controlled processes run without WTP data
Basic Event 65 - DoS attack to dosing system PLC
Gate 117 - Staff or PLC controlled disinfection processes run on altered WTP data
Gate 239 - Mislead PLC controlled WDN tank refill process
Basic Event 264 - Malware alters PLC statements that control valve
Basic Event 153 - External attacker manipulates WTP transmission devices
Basic Event 222 - A valve is opened and floods equipment
Basic Event 275 - Malware alters WDN control statements
Basic Event 238 - External person in situ manipulates WDN tank transmission system
Basic Event 188 - Internal person physically manipulates groundwater quality sensor readings
Basic Event 62 - Internal person silently takes over SCADA control
Gate 258 - WDN control center power supply failure
Basic Event 255 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates local power transformer signals
Basic Event 197 - External person physically manipulates well sensor signal
Basic Event 151 - External person physicaly manipulates tank quality sensor readings
Basic Event 179 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates reservoir control signals
Gate 219 - Staff controlled hydraulic processes run without WTP data
Basic Event 261 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of PBS operation
Basic Event 168 - External person physically manipulates surface water system sensor readings
Gate 119 - Insufficient disinfection process controlled by intruder
Basic Event 211 - External attacker manipulates WTP transmission devices
Basic Event 171 - Human error in operating/using surface water management system
Gate 113 - Lower efficiency of WTP disinfectant undetected
Basic Event 213 - Internal person silently takes over WTP SCADA control
Basic Event 49 - Internal person physically manipulates WTP sensor readings
Basic Event 277 - Malware tampers network topology characteristics on prediction models (e.g. tank volume curve)
Basic Event 64 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP control signals
Gate 260 - WDN control system manipulated
Basic Event 170 - External attacker manipulates surface water system transmission devices
Basic Event 199 - Internal person silently takes over abstraction well SCADA control
Basic Event 252 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN PBS sensor signals
Basic Event 273 - External person attacks WDN control room
Basic Event 183 - Raw water pump energy supply failure
Basic Event 156 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates abstraction point quality sensors
Gate 193 - Surface water management system functions on altered data
Basic Event 209 - External person physically manipulates WTP sensor readings
Basic Event 194 - External person manipulates transmission wires of wells
Basic Event 70 - Natural phenomena alter reagent dosing system
Basic Event 46 - Internal person jams WTP sensor signal transmission
Gate 243 - Insufficient power supply
Basic Event 258 - Malware DoS to local PBS PLC
Gate 237 - Outflow valve of WDN tank closed
Basic Event 151 - External person physicaly manipulates tank quality sensor readings
Gate 114 - Staff operate disinfection process without WTP data
Basic Event 51 - Internal cyber manipulation of WTP sensor signal
Basic Event 263 - DoS attack on WDN valve
Gate 226 - Undetected WTP power transformer failure
Gate 186 - Quality verification process runs on altered WTP data
Basic Event 274 - Ransomeware denies access to the WDN control system
Basic Event 237 - Malware alters PLC statements that control WDN tank refill
Basic Event 201 - Malware performs DoS attack on abstraction well PLCs
Basic Event 187 - External person physically manipulates groundwater quality sensor readings
Basic Event 61 - External person breaks in to WTP and takes over SCADA undetected
Basic Event 218 - Accidental errors by authorized user while maintaining information system
Basic Event 196 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates well sensor signal
Basic Event 150 - No sensor or insufficient type of quality sensor in the tank
Basic Event 260 - Internal person silently takes over PBS SCADA control
Basic Event 241 - No alternative power supply available
Basic Event 178 - Internal person silently takes over reservoir SCADA control
Gate 177 - Staff or PLC controlled processes run on altered WTP data
Basic Event 240 - Upadate of OS causes false positive alarms from Event Detection System
Basic Event 167 - External person physically manipulates surface water system sensor readings
Gate 111 - Insufficient disinfection due to loss of WTP control
Basic Event 208 - External attacker blocks WDN sensor signals to reach WTP
Basic Event 155 - External person physicaly manipulates abstraction point quality sensor readings
Basic Event 265 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WDN valve sensor signals
Basic Event 276 - SQL injection to data used for demand prediction
Basic Event 48 - External person physically manipulates WTP sensor readings
Basic Event 250 - Malware alters PLC statements that control pump
Basic Event 189 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates groundwater quality sensor signal
Basic Event 63 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of WTP operation
Gate 259 - Insufficient power supply
Basic Event 198 - External person breaks in to well control area and takes over SCADA
Gate 220 - Staff or PLC controlled hydraulic processes run on altered WTP data
Basic Event 152 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates quality sensor signals
Basic Event 243 - External power supply provider failure
Basic Event 219 - DoS attack to WTP process system PLC
Gate 178 - Dosing system disabled
Basic Event 214 - Undetected SCADA hijacking software takes control of WTP operation
Basic Event 152 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates quality sensor signals
Basic Event 245 - DoS attack on WDN pump
Basic Event 177 - External person breaks in to reservoir control area taking over SCADA
Basic Event 50 - Man-in-the-Middle attack manipulates WTP sensor signal
Basic Event 235 - External person in situ manipulates WDN tank level sensor
Gate 225 - Inability to perform WTP process due to enegy supply failure

Specific Assets

Control Center
Control System
Dosing System
Media Channels
Power Transformer
Pressure Boosting Station
Pump
Sensor
Server
Transmission Devices
Valve

Measure ID

M32

Name

EmergencyGenerators

Risk reduction mechanism

Consequences

Action characteristics

Proactive

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 740610. The publication reflects only the authors' views and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. All illustrations in the homepage are attributed to rudall30/Shutterstock.com.